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FROM CREWED TO SINGLE-PILOT OPERATIONS:
PILOT PERFORMANCE AND WORKLOAD MANAGEMENT
Anja K. Faulhaber
TU Braunschweig, Institute of Flight Guidance
Braunschweig, Germany
Higher levels of automation have come to replace human roles in the cockpit.
Therefore, a further reduction of the crew size from two pilots to one has become 
an option. Such single-pilot operations (SPO) need to provide at least the same 
safety standards as today’s two-crew operations (TCO). The present study aims at 
identifying potential issues in pilot performance and workload during SPO as 
opposed to TCO. Fourteen pilots flew short ILS approach and landing scenarios in 
a fixed-base A320 flight simulator. A 2x3 factorial design was used with the 
factors crew configuration (TCO and SPO) and scenario (baseline, turbulence and 
abnormal). Performance data and subjective workload ratings were collected. The
results suggest that workload might be problematic mostly during abnormal 
situations. The design of adequate support solutions for such situations will be a
major challenge for the implementation of SPO.
Commercial aircraft are commonly operated by two pilots – the pilot flying (PF) and the 
pilot monitoring (PM). This crew configuration could change in the future, considering the 
current discussion about a possible reduction of the crew size to one pilot. Economic factors are
the main drivers for the transition toward these so-called reduced-crew or single-pilot operations 
(SPO). Airlines want to save costs, gain more operational flexibility and prepare for an expected 
pilot shortage due to the growing demand for commercial aviation (Bilimoria, Johnson, &
Schutte, 2014; Comerford et al., 2013). The reduction of crew size has, in fact, a historical 
background in commercial aviation. During the past decades, cockpit crews have gradually been 
reduced from initially five crew members to today’s two-crew operations (TCO). So far this ‘de-
crewing’ has not led to any safety issues when it was accompanied by adequate technological 
support (Harris, 2007). In light of this historical trend and taking into account the ongoing
technological progress, a transition to SPO seems like the logical next step.
However, the implementation of SPO will be more complex than the previous transitions
from five to two crew members. Eliminating the second pilot means eliminating a part of the 
redundancy in the cockpit which has been a foundation for safe operations in aviation. Additional
support through automation might not be enough anymore to ensure safe flight conditions either 
(Bilimoria et al., 2014). It has even been proposed that we need a revolutionary approach 
entailing a complete rethinking of the pilot’s role and hence of the allocation of tasks between 
human and machine (Boy, 2014; Sprengart, Neis, & Schiefele, 2018). Further research is required
in this context to form a profound basis for a possible reconfiguration of the flight deck for SPO. 
From a human-centered perspective, one of the major challenges in the introduction of
SPO is workload (Koltz et al., 2015). Especially during abnormal scenarios, workload can reach 
critical levels in SPO (Bailey, Kramer, Kennedy, Stephens, & Etherington, 2017; Etherington, 
Kramer, Bailey, Kennedy, & Stephens, 2016). For normal scenarios, results from previous











    
   











    








    
 
  
   
   
  







   
 
 
conditions and found that workload ratings for TCO were higher than expected, almost at the
same level with the SPO workload ratings. An additional post-test questionnaire did, however, 
reveal a significant result for the effect of crew configuration on workload ratings. The authors
made limitations in their study design responsible for biased workload ratings, leaving open 
questions regarding the general validity of the study results. As human workload does play an 
important role in the conceptualization of SPO, these open issues require further investigation.
The present study aims at tackling these open issues and providing a better understanding
of workload and performance in SPO. Therefore, a flight simulator study was conducted. The
study design was loosely based on Etherington et al. (2016) and Bailey et al. (2017) but a focus 
on the approach and landing phases of flight was chosen. These are particularly demanding 
phases for pilots and can be expected to reach critical levels in SPO (Koltz et al., 2015).
Additionally, a within-subject design was used to avoid effects of individual differences. The
complete design of the study will be explained in more detail subsequently.
Material and Methods
Participants
Fourteen pilots (1 female) participated in the study. They were aged between 26 and 56 
years (M = 41.14, SD = 9.44) and their flying experience ranged from 300 to 22000 flight hours 
(M = 6204, SD = 6271). Five of them were captains and first officers each and one of them was
senior first officer. The remaining three participants didn’t report a rank because they were not 
working for an airline at the time. Participation was voluntary and unpaid. The study was 
performed according to institutional and national standards for the protection of human subjects.
Experiment Design
The study was conducted in a fixed-base A320 flight simulator. A 2x3 factorial within-
subject design was chosen. The factors were crew configuration (TCO and SPO) and scenario 
(baseline, turbulence and abnormal). Participants flew one trial per condition resulting in a total 
of six experimental trials. The task for each trial was to manually fly short ILS approach and 
landing scenarios at Frankfurt Airport, runway 25 left. Each trial lasted about 2.5 minutes. The
initial situation was always the same: The scenario started 8 nm from the runway at an altitude of 
about 2600 ft. Airspeed was set to 180 kt, the landing gear was still retracted and the flaps were
already extended to 15° (indication 2). The view was clear and there were no clouds. The wind 
was calm; only in the turbulence scenario moderate turbulence was simulated. In the abnormal 
scenario, an engine fire was induced when the participants reached an altitude of 1800 ft. 
The NASA Task Load Index (TLX) (Hart & Staveland, 1988) was used to assess 
subjective workload ratings directly after each scenario. It consists of six workload subscales –
mental demand, physical demand, temporal demand, performance, effort, and frustration – which 
are all rated on a scale from 0-100. Qualitative data in the form of video and audio recordings 
from each session as well as debriefing interviews were collected. Additionally, eye tracking data 
and simulator parameter were recorded. Only data of the PF sitting in the left seat were collected. 
The present paper will focus on the analysis of the TLX scores and observed behavior patterns 






   
   
   
 
 




   
 













   
   
 
      
      
    
   









Pilots participated in teams of two. Upon arrival, they were briefed on the experiment, 
received the material (checklists, charts and a Quick Reference Handbook) and gave informed 
consent. Afterward, each participant was allowed one or two training trials as PF depending on 
their prior experience with the A320. If they felt confident after the first training trial, the second 
one was skipped. The experiment started with the first participant as PF in the SPO condition. 
The second participant was waiting in the briefing room. After finishing the three scenarios in the 
SPO condition, the second pilot joined in as PM and together they flew the same scenarios in the
TCO condition. Then participants changed roles and seats – the first participant became PM and 
the second one PF. Now the second pilot flew all three scenarios first in the TCO condition with 
the PM and afterward alone in the SPO condition. Hence, half the participants started with the 
SPO condition while the other half started with the TCO condition. After each scenario, the PF
completed the NASA TLX. The order of the scenarios was balanced; each participant was 
assigned a different order. When the experimental trials were completed, a short debriefing
interview with both participants concluded the session. The total duration was about two hours.
Results
In order to investigate the effects of the factors crew configuration and scenario on the 
perceived workload, a two-way repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the NASA TLX 
data. The level of significance was p ≤ 0.05. Matlab was used for all analyses.
Workload
The results showed that workload was at the same level for SPO and TCO baseline
conditions but trended higher for the turbulence and abnormal conditions in SPO (Figure 1). The
baseline condition yielded nearly the same mean values for TCO (M = 37.74, SD = 20.74) and 
SPO (M = 37.62, SD = 15.11). In the turbulence condition, there was a small difference with 
means of 37.68 (SD = 13.81) for TCO and 43.15 (SD = 13.39) for SPO.  As expected, the 
abnormal condition received the highest workload scores and the most prominent difference in
ratings with mean scores of 50.3 (SD = 14.36) for TCO and 56.9 (SD = 17.88) for SPO.
However, the results from the ANOVA revealed that the effect of the factor crew 
configuration did not reach significance (F1,13 = 2.54, p = 0.135, η2p = 0.163) and neither did the 
interaction effect (F2,26 = 1.15, p = 0.331, η2p = 0.082). A significant main effect was found
though for the factor scenario (F2,26 = 8.02, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.382). A bonferroni post-hoc test 
showed that this effect applied only to the abnormal scenario compared to both the baseline (p =
0.021) and turbulence scenarios (p = 0.026). The post-hoc comparison of baseline and turbulence
scenarios did not reach significance. 
The subscales of the NASA TLX were additionally analyzed separately to understand 
which of them were affected most by the factor crew configuration and which contributed most to 
the overall workload rating. A look at the unweighted mean scores showed that the subscales for
mental demand and effort received the highest mean workload scores in general (Figure 2). With 
the exception of the performance subscale, scores were consistently higher in SPO as opposed to 
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Figure 1. Bar graphs showing NASA TLX Figure 2. Bar graphs showing the NASA TLX 
unweighted mean composite workload scores unweighted mean workload scores for each
representative of the 2x3 factorial design. subscale for the factor crew configuration.
Error bars show standard errors of the mean. Error bars show standard errors of the mean.
The NASA TLX mean subscale workload scores for the factor crew configuration are
summarized with the respective ANOVA results in Table 1. The subscales for temporal demand 
and frustration show the highest difference in mean scores. These were also the only subscales 
for which a significant effect of the factor crew configuration was found. In conclusion, temporal 
demand and frustration seem to be the subscales affected most by the crew configuration while 
mental demand and effort contribute most to the overall workload ratings.
Table 1. 
Statistics for the NASA TLX unweighted workload scores for the factor crew configuration.
Mean (SD) ANOVA η2 p 
TCO SPO F1,13 p
Mental 51.79 (21.24) 54.76 (23.84) 0.62 0.445 0.046
Physical 35 (25.71) 38.93 (25.72) 0.99 0.337 0.071
Temporal 40.83 (24.86) 49.05 (26.65 8.17 0.013 0.386
Performance 43.21 (24.96) 41.07 (25.7) 0.22 0.650 0.016
Effort 50.36 (20.76) 53.21 (18) 0.40 0.536 0.030
Frustration 30.24 (21.75) 38.33 (25.15) 7.23 0.019 0.358
Composite 41.91 (17.27) 45.89 (17.26) 2.54 0.135 0.163






   
     
     
   
   
    
    
   











   











    




   
  
     
 
Performance
Qualitative analysis of pilot’s behavior patterns during the experiment revealed that 
participants developed different strategies to manage workload in the SPO condition. The
majority of participants (9 out of 14) talked to themselves or called out each step while following
the landing checklist. Some of them even made exactly the same calls they were used to from 
TCO. Thinking aloud was however never mentioned nor asked for during the briefing session and 
this could hence be interpreted as a way to handle workload. Further analyses of pilot
performance showed that checklist usage was more consistent in TCO. When distracted by other 
tasks, the PF was generally more prone to forget the completion of the landing checklist. An 
interesting case of this type happened during the abnormal scenario in the SPO condition and led 
to a crashed landing because the landing gear had not been extended. The participant confused 
the warning sound indicating that the gear was still retracted with the alarm triggered by the 
engine fire and became aware of this mistake shortly before touchdown when it was too late. 
There were similar situations in the TCO condition, where the PF did not actively demand to 
check the status of the landing checklist because he or she was distracted by other tasks. In these
cases, the PM reminded the PF of the checklist and suggested further steps if necessary.
In general, there was no consensus on whether the abnormal procedure for the engine fire
should be performed at all during the approach and landing phases of flight. In fact, only four 
participants performed the procedure in both TCO and SPO abnormal conditions consistently. Six 
of the participants decided that it would always be best to concentrate on the landing and to 
disregard the warning completely. They only informed ATC about the situation and cleared the 
warning. Interestingly, the remaining four participants performed the procedure thoroughly in the
TCO condition. In the SPO condition, however, they either decided to disregard the warning or 
they started the abnormal procedure checklist and aborted before they could complete it. One of 
the participants even commented that it would be risky to perform the procedure without 
someone else watching over it. 
Discussion and Conclusions
The present study aimed at investigating workload and performance in SPO compared to 
TCO conditions. Results revealed that workload was not perceived as higher in baseline SPO 
conditions but only in scenarios involving turbulence or abnormal procedures. This is to a certain 
extent in line with the results from previous studies (Bailey et al., 2017; Etherington et al., 2016). 
However, the differences in workload ratings between SPO and TCO were small and several 
participants even reported after the experiment, that they did not perceive workload as a major 
issue for SPO. Comparing the NASA TLX ratings to results from other studies shows, though,
that the highest mean of 56.9 from the SPO abnormal condition is higher than 75% of all TLX
scores obtained from aircraft piloting tasks (Grier, 2016). It can, therefore, be considered as 
relatively high. In particular the temporal and frustration dimensions of workload were found to 
be affected most by the SPO condition. Observation of pilot performance also indicated that 
higher workload did lead to more errors and less accuracy in the completion of tasks, especially
during the abnormal SPO condition. Further challenges for the implementation of SPO are
therefore to design adequate support for such high workload situations. Several concepts have
already been proposed such as a ground operator (Lachter et al., 2014) or a harbor pilot (Koltz et 
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